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Commentary & Reply
Adding to “Net Assessment”
To the Editor:
In his article, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide” (Parameters, Spring
2006), Paul Bracken has performed a useful service in laying out some of the
skills associated with the practice of net assessment. As one who has worked,
directly and indirectly, for Andy Marshall over the past two decades, I found the
article refreshingly straightforward; it should prove helpful to those seeking to
acquire net assessment skills. At the same time, I thought it might be useful to
add a couple of thoughts to round out Mr. Bracken’s article.
Over the years, net assessments have generally fallen into one of two
categories: regional (e.g., the military balance in Europe, the military balance in
Northeast Asia) or functional (the strategic nuclear balance, the military investment balance between the United States and the Soviet Union). Different net
assessments required different analytic approaches and tools. Even within each
category, the approaches and tools were different, as they were a function of the
strategic characteristics of the area being assessed.
In terms of “Strategic Interactions,” one must be careful not to couch the
net assessments in terms of “anticipated reactions of opponents.” Often, opponents take actions that are not reactions to our defense policies, but are driven by
other factors—third parties, geography, the desires of senior decisionmakers,
organizational cultures, national or organizational objectives, etc.
In fact, one of the major “Strategic Asymmetries” that often exists between the two sides lies in their objectives. A good analysis of US strategic and
operational objectives can help us identify what measures are most useful for any
particular net assessment. And a good analysis of our competitor’s objectives
might help us understand how he assesses the situation, an assessment which may
be very different from ours—potentially providing us with opportunities to improve our relative position.
Mr. Bracken’s characterization of the way the United States breaks its national security problems down between the military and the civilian intelligence
communities would benefit by adding the national labs and the Department of
Homeland Security. Of course, none of those organizations are monolithic, unitary
actors. Within the military, for example, one might find big differences between the
operational, intelligence, and research and development communities. Over the
years, two of net assessment’s major contributions have been to highlight the operational domain, as well as to attempt integrated analysis across the domains.
As for “Getting Things Right with a Little Thought,” Mr. Marshall has often pointed out that one of the major contributions that net assessments can make
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is to help senior decisionmakers think about the problem or issue area in a particular way. Getting the questions right is more important at that stage than trying to
get the right answers. Focus on diagnosis, Mr. Marshall says, not prescription. If
you get that right, then lots of people can work on getting the right answers.
That is one reason Mr. Marshall has continually maintained that one
should separate the net assessment function from the strategic planning activity.
A second reason is that if the same office is charged with both missions, it is only
human nature to “cook the books” on the net assessment—that is, to skew the assessment toward what you “know” is the right answer, resulting in a less-thanobjective net assessment.
Finally, Mr. Bracken is absolutely right when he points out that net assessments cannot be effectively conducted at the National Security Council level.
That is why, in 1973, President Nixon moved the net assessment function from
the NSC (where it was under Henry Kissinger) to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (reporting to James Schlesinger). It has remained there for more than
three decades.
Jeffrey S. McKitrick
Leesburg, Virginia
The Author Replies:
Jeffrey McKitrick makes good points which I agree with. Net assessment
is an important discipline and should be in the toolkit of anyone involved in competitive strategy.
Paul Bracken
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